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1 Introduction
Is globalisation great news for less-skilled workers in developing and newly industrialized coun-
tries? Some fear for the consequences of globalisation for less qualied workers in the northern
developed part in the world. With increased trade openness, and with a more educated work-
force in the North and an abundance of unskilled labour in the South, a simple comparative
advantage story should imply that production which is not skill-intensive should move south-
wards, while more technologically advanced production is retained in the North. This could
spell trouble for those in the North who nd it di¢ cult to acquire the necessary skills for such
advanced production they could either see their jobs disappear or their wage level dwindle to
a very uncomfortable level.
However, the ip side of this coin should be that unskilled industries in the South expand, and
that the demand for unskilled labour in these countries increases. While globalisation can lead to
more wage inequality in the North, we should perhaps expect the reverse to happen in the South?
Empirically, this does not seem to hold at all. A famous example is Mexico. Hanson and Harrison
(1999) point out that Mexico experienced a dramatic increase in the skilled-unskilled wage gap
during a period of trade liberalisation.1 Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez (2003) and Verhoogen
(2008) argue that the unexpected widening of wage di¤erentials following trade liberalisation
is rooted in technological change. More trade led to quality upgrading in Mexican production,
benetting the relatively more skilled workers in that economy. Zhu and Treer (2005) develop
a theoretical model with endowments-based comparative advantages and technological catch-up
in the South. Southern catch-up causes production of the least skill-intensive northern goods to
migrate to the South where they become the most skill-intensive goods, and wage inequality
increases both there and in the North. Their empirical analysis reveals that among developing
and newly industrialised countries, the sharpest increase in inequality can be found where export
shares have shifted towards more skill-intensive goods.
It is easy to grasp the idea that globalisation has lead to southern technological catch-up
1See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for a comprehensive review of empirical evidence showing similar results.
Pavcnik (2003) studies technology transfer, skill upgrading and inequality in Chile. More recentcly, Rattsø and
Stokke (2010) have drawn attention to the increasing wage inequality in South Africa following the fall of Apartheid
and the subsequent increase in trade openness.
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and a consequent sharp rise in wage inequality. An interesting follow-up question, though, is if
there is something wrong from a welfare perspective about the way southern countries progress
technologically? As unskilled labour is so excessively abundant, why should new technologies
complement skills also in these countries? Acemoglu (1998) has argued that technical change is
directedin the sense that it complements or substitutes for other factors according to what pays.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) adapt the theory of directed technological change to a North-
South setting. In northern countries, technological development will naturally complement skills
and contribute toward increased wage dispersion. If southern countries simply rely on catching-
up technologically by copying technology developed in the North, also they will eventually
implement these new technologies, even though they do not sit well with the composition of
their labour forces. But this is not necessarily a market failure copying a technology which
does not perfectly t ones needs might be far better than having no technological development
at all.
In the present paper we shed some light on these broader issues by focusing on the potential
role played by di¤erent labour market institutions in determining the incentives for North-
South technology transfer through multinational enterprises. It has long been recognised that
multinationals play a ubiquitous role in technology transfers between the developed and the
developing world. Caves (2007) cites many studies arguing that multinationals tend to install
similar technologies in the South as the ones already being employed in the North, even though
the relative factor abundance of di¤erent types of labour can be very di¤erent. Our paper
develops a theoretical model where multinationals may determine how much and what type of
knowledge that is transferred to subsidiaries in the South. A starting point assumption is that
the workforce in the North is unionised. Will multinational corporations transfer technology to
subsidiaries in the South as part of a power struggle with northern workforces? How will labour
market institutions in the North and the South interact, and what does that in turn imply for
technology transfer? In short, we are trying to nd out what labour market institutions, such
as the presence of trade unions and minimum wages both in northern and southern economies,
imply for transfer of technology and if this in turn can help explain why multinationals seem
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to install rather advanced technologies even in countries where unskilled labour is available in
abundance. This in turn could provide a part-answer to the question why globalisation and
foreign direct investment seem to be accompanied with rising inequalities also in the South.
We look at two di¤erent forms of technology transfers. Firstly, a rm can upgrade the
quality of the product produced in the South, making it more similar to what the multinational
produces in the North. Secondly, the multinational can also transfer knowledge that upgrades
the skills and productivity of southern labour. Unionised northern workers have no direct
inuence over what technologies their companies install in countries far away, but as we shall
see, decisions on technology transfers may impact wage bargaining.2 This inuence on wage
bargaining might in turn help decide how technology is transferred in a North-South framework.
While we throughout assume that northern workers are unionised, our rst assumption is that
southern workers have no bargaining power, but there is a minimum wage policy that regulates
wages in the formal sector in the South. In an extension to this benchmark model, we introduce
trade unions also in the industrialising country, so that northern and southern unions within the
same multinational in e¤ect play a game against each other while putting forward wage claims.
The e¤ects of minimum wage policies in the South are then analysed also in the presence of
unionised southern workers.
In the main version of the model, with unionised labour in the North and minimum wages
in the South, stronger unions in the North lead to more technology transfers, both in the form
of product quality upgrading and skill upgrading. Technology transfer clearly is a weapon that
a multinational can use against its northern workforce. A higher southern wage level, on the
other hand, will discourage incentives to upgrade product quality in the South, but incentives
for skill upgrading can in fact be increased.3 Thus, a minimum wage policy in the South will
tend to shift incentives from product quality upgrading to skill upgrading. Interestingly, when
technology choices are endogenous, it cannot be taken for granted that northern workers will
benet from higher wages in the South. On the contrary, northern workers might actually su¤er
2Dowrick and Spencer (1994) and Lommerud, Meland and Straume (2006) consider trade unions that can
veto technological change, but in these models there are no southern trade unions or minimum wages, and new
technology arrives exogenously.
3This is related to earlier results that minimum wages can encourage skill formation (Agell and Lommerud
(1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)), although the context is very di¤erent.
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if incentives for skill upgrading are stimulated to a su¢ cient extent.
In the extended version of the model, both northern and southern workers are represented
by trade unions. These cannot coordinate their actions, so they are pitted against each other
by the production decisions of the multinational. We nd clearly that unions in the North and
the South have opposite interests when it comes to skill upgrading. However, while northern
workers lose from product quality upgrading, their southern counterparts will gain in some
circumstances and lose in others. Since quality upgrading implies that competition between
workers in the North and the South is intensied, this particular type of technology transfer
might actually worsen the situation not only for northern workers, but also for their southern
counterparts. Thus, although both types of technology transfers are generally protable for
the rm, technology transfer in the form of product quality upgrading might be a particularly
e¤ective instruments for multinationals in order to extract rents from workers. In this setting,
with trade unions in both the North and the South, we also nd that the introduction of a
minimum wage (which may or may not bind in equilibrium) will generally stimulate incentives
for technology transfer, and to a larger extent than in the main model without trade unions in
the South.
Our paper clearly relates to the large literature on unionised international oligopoly.4 The
central question in that literature is how unionised workers in the North fare when they are
exposed to harsher international competition. The labour market in the South is typically
portrayed as competitive, and the fate of southern workers is not given attention. A partial ex-
ception is Grieben and Sener (2009), who use a North-South product cycle model, with unionised
workers in the North, and study the e¤ects on innovation by trade liberalisation both in the
North and the South. Nevertheless, they also use the assumption that the labour market in the
South is competitive.
As trade unions are not as prevalent in all northern economies as they are in some, several
authors have sought to study labour market rigidities and globalisation in other frameworks
than the unionised one. Firstly, there is a literature on spillover e¤ects among countries from
4See, e.g., Naylor (1998, 1999), Lommerud, Meland and Sørgard (2003), Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard
(2006), Eckel and Egger (2009), Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) and Ishida and Matsushima (2009).
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national minimum wages.5 Closer to the trade union literature are models of matching frictions,
possibly with individual wage bargaining.6 Finally, also models where workers have fair-wage
preferences and this inuences wage structures, should be mentioned.7 Some of this work is
tailored to a US-Europe context, with less emphasis on southern economies. But the most
important di¤erence between our paper and this whole body of literature is that we study wage
formation within multinational rms. The interlinkages among workers in the same rm but in
di¤erent countries then become pressing and the question of within-rm technology transfer
arises.
Another large body of literature relevant to our study concerns itself with North-South
technology transfer within multinational corporations.8 Even though this literature identies
many externalities in the technology transfer process, focus has not been on external e¤ects on
a unionised northern workforce, or on strategic interactions between trade unions representing
workers in di¤erent subsidiaries of the multinational rm.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The main model with wage bargaining
in the North and an exogenous wage in the South is presented Section 2 and analysed in Sections
3-5. The model is then extended in Section 6 to capture the case where also workers in the South
have collective bargaining power. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider a rm that can produce a certain good in the North denoted Brand N using labour
as the only factor of production with a linear technology, where one unit of labour produces one
unit of output. Workers in the North are unionised and wages are decided in Nash bargaining
between the rm and a trade union representing the workers. The rm has also the option
to produce a lower-quality version of the good in the South denoted Brand S where the
technology and skill-level are less advanced, but labour is cheap.
5See, e.g., Davis (1998) and Egger, Egger and Markusen (2009).
6Examples of this literature include Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2008), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010),
Boulhol (2010) and Decreuse and Maarek (2010).
7See, e.g., Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2009).
8See, e.g., Glass and Saggi (1998), Pack and Saggi (2001), Olsen and Osmundsen (2003), Cheng, Qiu and Tan
(2005), Müller and Schnitzer (2006), and Blalock and Gertler (2008).
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Product demand is derived from consumer preferences that correspond to a standard vertical
di¤erentiation framework (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). The rm can supply both brands to an
integrated world market where consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their willingness-
to-pay. More specically, consumers are identied by a preference parameter  s U [0; a], and
the utility function of a consumer of type  is given by
u =
8><>:    pN if buying Brand N   pS if buying Brand S ; (1)
where pi is the price of Brand i 2 fN;Sg, and Brand N is perceived to be of higher quality
than Brand S. The quality di¤erence is represented by 1 , where  2 (0; 1). We assume unit
demand, where each consumer buys either one or zero units of one of the brands. The total
consumer mass is normalised to 1.
Let qi be the produced quantity of Brand i, wN the bargained wage in the North, wS an
exogenous wage level in the South and  2 (0; 1) a technology parameter measuring labour
productivity in the South. If the rm produces both brands, and for a given technology level,
prots are given by
 = (pN   wN ) qN + (pS   !S) qS ; (2)
where !S :=
wS
 is the e¤ective wage in the South.
The two parameters  and  represent the state of technology in the South. This state depend
on the degree of technology transfer from the North to the South within the multinational rm.
For a given initial state of technology (0 and 0), the rm can increase both labour productivity
and product quality by transferring technology ( and , respectively) to the plant in the
South. The cost of technology transfer is given by a function c (;), which is (at least) twice
di¤erentiable, increasing, separable and strictly convex in both arguments, with c (0; 0) = 0. The
state of technology in the South is thus given by  := 0 + and  := 0 +. We will refer
to  and  as skill upgrading and product quality upgrading, respectively.
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Workers in the North are represented by a trade union, whose utility is given by
UN = (wN   rN ) LN ; (3)
where rN is the reservation wage level,  > 0 is a parameter measuring the degree of wage
orientation, and LN = qN is the level of employment.
The sequence of events are assumed to be as follows:
Stage 0: The rm chooses its product line: Only Brand N , only Brand S, or both N and S.
Stage 1: Given that S will be produced, the rm chooses the degree of technology transfer 
skill upgrading and product quality upgrading from the North to the South.
Stage 2: The rm and its trade union bargain over the wage level in the North.
Stage 3: The rm chooses how much to produce.
Notice that, by placing the product line and technology transfer decisions prior to wage
bargaining, we implicitly assume that it is impossible for the union to commit to a certain wage
policy in order to inuence these decisions directly.9
3 Optimal choice of product line
Assume that both brands are produced. From the utility function, demand is given by
qN =
a  b
a
and qS =
b   pS
a
; (4)
where
b := pN   pS
1   : (5)
9 In the literature on trade unions and o¤shoring (Skaksen and Sørensen (2001), Zhao (2001), Lommerud,
Meland and Straume (2009) and Koskela and Stenbacka (2009)), attention is implicitly focused on Stage 0, while
ignoring what we here have dubbed Stage 1.
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Thus, consumers with high willingness-to-pay ( > b) will buy Brand N , consumers with inter-
mediate willingness-to-pay ( 2

pS
 ;b) will buy Brand S, while consumers will low willingness-
to-pay ( < pS ) will refrain from buying.
The prot maximising prices are given by
pN =
1
2
(a+ wN ) and pS =
1
2
(a+ !S) : (6)
The corresponding quantities are
qN =
a(1  )  wN + !S
2a (1  ) and qS =
wN   !S
2a (1  ): (7)
The existence of an interior solution (i.e., qN > 0 and qS > 0) requires that
wN   a(1  ) < !S < wN : (8)
Proposition 1 The following two conditions are necessary for the optimal product line to con-
sist of both varieties:
1. The e¤ective wage rate must be lower in the South than in the North
2. The quality di¤erence between the two varieties must neither be too small nor too large.
Proof. Follows immediately from (8).
If the rst condition is violated, the rm will only produce BrandN , which by assumption can
only be produced in the North. Notice that this condition implicitly rules out the possibility of
producing both brands in the North (given that the production costs are equal for both brands).
If the second condition is violated, the rm will either produce only Brand S in the South (if 
is su¢ ciently large) or only Brand N (if  is su¢ ciently low).
In the following we will concentrate on the interior solution. To ensure that this solution
exists for a parameter space that is as large as possible, we assume that !S < rN < a. By
assuming that the e¤ective wage rate in the South is lower than the reservation wage in the
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North, we ensure that the rst condition in Proposition 1 is always met. Then we know that
interior solutions will always exist for intermediate ranges of .
4 Wage bargaining
We assume that the wage level in the North is determined as a solution to the following Nash
bargaining problem:
wN = argmax
 
UN   UN

(   N )1  ; (9)
where  measures the relative bargaining strength of the trade union, and UN and N are the
disagreement payo¤s of the union and the rm, respectively. We assume that the unionised
workers do not have access to alternative employment during a bargaining conict; i.e., UN = 0.
The rm, on the other hand, is still able to produce Brand S in the South during a conict
in the North. We assume that, in case of a bargaining conict, the rm optimally adjusts its
production of Brand S to maximise prots for qN = 0. This implies that the disagreement payo¤
of the rm is given by
N =
1
4
(a  !S)2
a
: (10)
The bargained wage is then given by
wN =
(2  ) rN +  (!S + a(1  ))
2   (1  ) : (11)
All comparative statics results for wN are unambiguous, given that both brands are sold.
Proposition 2 The bargained wage in the North is
1. increasing in a; ,  and rN ;
2. decreasing in  and ;
3. increasing in wS :
Proof. Follows immediately from (11).
10
The rst part of the proposition is standard, and requires no further explanation. The
second and third parts show how wages in the North depend on technology and labour market
conditions in the South when production in the North and the South are linked through the rms
production decisions. If labour productivity increases in the South (for instance through transfer
of technology), the e¤ective wage rate in the South will drop. This means that it becomes more
protable for the rm (partly) to replace production of Brand N with production of Brand S,
which makes demand for labour in the North more elastic. In addition, a lower e¤ective wage
rate in the South increases the disagreement payo¤ of the rm in case of a bargaining conict.
Both these factors contribute to a lower bargained wage in the North. Similar e¤ects apply to
an increase in . Transfer of technology that enables the rm to produce Brand S with a higher
quality will reduce the bargained wage in the North. On the other hand, a higher e¤ective
wage rate in the South, for instance through an increase in the legal minimum wage, will then
obviously be accompanied by an increase also in wN .
For a given state of technology in the South, equilibrium quantities and prices for the two
brands are given by
qN =
(2  ) (!S + a (1  )  rN )
2 (2 +  (   1)) (1  ) ; qS =
 (1  ) (a  !S) + (2  ) (rN  !S)
2 (2 +  (   1)) (1  ) a ;
(12)
pN =
(rN + a) (2  ) +  (!S + a (2  ))
2 (2 +  (   1)) ; pS =
!S + a
2
: (13)
Union utility and prots are
U = ()

2  
2a (1  )

!S + a(1  )  rN
(2 +  (   1))
+1
(14)
and
 =
(2  ) (!S + a(1  )  rN )) ((2  ) (a  rN )   (!S   a))
4a (1  ) (2 +  (   1))2
+
( (1  ) (!S   a) + (2  ) (!S   rN)) (!S   a)
4a (1  ) (2 +  (   1)) : (15)
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Based on (14) and (15), the union and the rm can be shown to have diametrically opposite
incentives with respect to the state of technology in the South:
Proposition 3 (i) For a given state of technology, a higher wage in the South benets the union
in the North but reduces the prots of the rm.
(ii) A better state of technology in the South (higher  and/or  at zero cost) increases the
prots of the rm but reduces union utility in the North.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that the positive relationship between labour conditions (wS) in South and union
utility in the North is derived for a given state of technology in the South. If we endogenise the
rms technology transfer decision, improvement of labour conditions in the South might a¤ect
the incentives for technology transfer in a way that potentially harms the unionised workers in
the North. This question will de dealt with in the next section.
5 Technology transfer
Prior to wage bargaining in the North, and assuming that the optimal product line involves
producing both brands, the rm decides on the optimal degree of technology transfer (skill
upgrading and product quality upgrading) to the plant in the South. For the parameter con-
gurations that yield an interior solution for the optimal product line choice, we know from
Proposition 3 (part (ii)) that  is monotonically increasing in  and . Thus, a su¢ ciently
convex cost function will secure an interior solution (; ), where technology is transferred
from the initial level (0; 0).
Our main objective is to analyse how the incentives for North-South technology transfer
depend on labour market conditions in the North and the South. More specically, we want to
examine how incentives for technology transfer depend on union bargaining power in the North
() and the wage level in the South (wS).
We can assess the e¤ect of marginal parameter changes around the interior solution, (; ),
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by evaluating the sign of the relevant second-order cross derivatives of the prot function.10
Considering rst the e¤ect of union bargaining power in North on incentives for technology
transfer, the sign of these e¤ects are given by the signs of
@2
@@
=
2 (2  ) (a(1  )  (rN   !S))!S
(1  ) a (2 +  (   1))3  ; (16)
@2
@@
=
(2  )

a2 (1  )2   (rN   !S)2


a (1  )2 (2 +  (   1))3 : (17)
Similarly, the impact of a higher wage in the South for example through minimum wage policies
is given by
@2
@wS@
=
(2  )2 (rN  2!S) +  (1  ) (a  2!S) (4   (2  ))
2 (1  ) (2 +  (   1))2 2a (18)
and
@2
@wS@
=  
 
(2  )2 (!S +  (rN   2!S)) + !S (1  )2 (4   (2  ))
2a (2 +  (   1))2 (1  )2 2
!
: (19)
From (16)-(19), we can establish how incentives for technology transfer depends on labour con-
ditions in the North (union strength) and the South (minimum wage), respectively, as follows:
Proposition 4 (i) Stronger trade unions in the North unambiguously increase incentives for
both types of technology transfer.
(ii) A higher wage in the South always reduces incentives for product quality upgrading, while
incentives for skill upgrading are increased (reduced) if
!S < (>) b! := 
2
 
a (1  ) (4   (2  )) + rN (2  )2
 (1  ) (4   (2  )) + (2  )2
!
: (20)
10By the Implicit Function Theorem,
@
@
=  
@2
@@
@2
@2
and
@
@
=  
@2
@@
@2
@2
;
where @
2
@2
< 0 and @
2
@2
< 0, due to the second-order conditions for the rms prot-maximising choices of
technology transfer.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for the rst part of the proposition is quite straightforward. As stronger
unions make the production of Brand N more expensive, the multinational rm can counteract
this e¤ect by transferring more technology to the South, which worsens the unions bargaining
position in the North (cf. Proposition 2). Thus, through the particular product market linkage
explored in this paper, we have identied a possible mechanism whereby the presence of powerful
trade unions in the North will reinforce incentives for North-South technology transfer within
multinational rms.
The second part of the proposition shows that labour conditions in the South have qualita-
tively di¤erent e¤ects on the two types of technology transfer. In other words, a higher wage in
the South might a¤ect not only the extent but also the predominant type of technology trans-
fer. While better labour conditions in the South always reduce incentives for product quality
upgrading, incentives for skill upgrading are ambiguously a¤ected. A higher wage in the South
will increase the rms incentives for technology transfers which improve labour productivity in
the South, if the e¤ective wage rate in the South is su¢ ciently low to begin with. A contributing
factor to this result is the convexity of  in !S . The higher the e¤ective wage rate in the South,
the lower is the positive prot gain of a marginal reduction in the e¤ective wage rate through
skill upgrading. Thus, as long as !S < b!, a wage increase in the South will shift incentives for
technology transfer from product quality upgrading to skill upgrading.
When seen in conjunction with Proposition 3, the second part of Proposition 4 suggests
that, when endogenising the type and extent of technology transfer, the unionised workers in
the North might not necessarily benet from improved labour conditions in the South. The total
e¤ect of a higher wage in the South on union utility in the North is given, on general form, by
dU
dwS
=
@U
@wS
+
@U
@
@
@wS
+
@U
@
@
@wS
: (21)
The rst term is the direct e¤ect for a given state of technology, which is positive (cf. Proposition
3). The second term is the indirect e¤ect via product quality upgrading. From Proposition 4 we
know that this e¤ect is also unambiguously positive. Thus, the dampening e¤ect on incentives
14
for product quality upgrading reinforces the benets that unionised workers in the North enjoy
from better labour conditions in the South. However, the last term is negative if the e¤ective
wage rate in the South is su¢ ciently low. Thus, we cannot theoretically rule out the possibility
that the overall e¤ect of higher wages in the South might, paradoxically, be negative for the
unionised workers, if this spurs skill upgrading in the South to a su¢ cient degree.
6 Wage bargaining in the South
In this section we endogenise wS by assuming that also workers in the South are unionised. Along
the lines of our previous analysis, we start out by characterising the labour market equilibrium
and analysing how wages (in the North and the South) depend on technology. Subsequently,
we investigate how minimum wage policies in the South a¤ect incentives for technology transfer
and, in turn, worker welfare in the North and the South.
We assume that workers in the South are organised in a trade union with utility
US = (wS   rS)LS ; (22)
where LS = qS= is the employment level in the South. To enhance tractability, we assume
 = 1 for unions in both the South and the North, and additionally, we set the reservation wage
level in the North equal to unity (rN = 1) and assume rS < 1 < a, which will ensure that wages
are lower in the South than in the North. Additionally, we set  = 12 .
6.1 Equilibrium wages
Wages in the North and the South are now both determined in multi-unit bargaining between
the multinational rm and the two trade unions. We assume initially that there are no minimum
wage policies in place. Applying the multi-unit bargaining model developed by Davidson (1988),
the bargained wages in the North and the South are given by the simultaneous solution to the
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following pair of Nash bargaining problems:
wN = argmax
 
UN   UN

(   N ) ; (23)
wS = argmax
 
US   US

(   S) ; (24)
where N and S are the prots of the rm in case of a bargaining conict between the rm and
the union in, respectively, the South and the North. As before, we assume U i = 0, i = S;N ,
and that the rm optimally adjusts its production of the other brand to maximise prots during
a bargaining conict with one of the unions. N is still given by (10), while
S =
(a  wN )2
4a
: (25)
Simultaneously solving the two maximisation problems, the bargained wages are
wN =
4a(1  ) + 12 + 3S
16   ; (26)
wS =
 (a(1  ) + 12S + 3)
16   ; (27)
where S :=
rS
 is the e¤ective reservation wagein the South. For consistency, we need eq. (8)
to be fullled. This requires
 < S < ; (28)
where
 :=
1
3
(4    4a(1  )) (29)
and
 :=
 (a(1  ) + 3)
4   : (30)
Notice that  > , implying the existence of an interior solution, if a > 1. Furthermore, the
above conditions satisfy wN > !S , making the North the high-cost country. From (26)-(27), we
derive:
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Proposition 5 (i) The bargained wage in the North is increasing in a and rS, and decreasing
in  and ;
(ii) The bargained wage in the South is increasing in a, rS and , and decreasing in  i¤
a > 48+12S
32 2 16 and  > 16  4
p
15.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The rst part of the proposition shows that the comparative statics properties of the wage in
the North are qualitatively unchanged by endogenising the wage in the South (cf. Proposition 2).
However, the important thing to notice here is the asymmetric impact of technology investment
on the wages in the South and the North. An increase in  enables the rm to produce Brand
S cheaper, since the e¤ective wage rate in the South drops. When workers in the South are
unionised, they are able to capture some of this gain through wage bargaining, implying a higher
wage in the South. The drop in the e¤ective wage rate in the South has two direct e¤ects that
contribute to a drop in the bargained wage in the North. First, the rms incentive to produce
more of the cheaper Brand S and less of the more expensive Brand N makes labour demand
more elastic in the North. Second, the disagreement payo¤ of the rm in case of a bargaining
conict in the North increases.11
Regarding product quality upgrading, the e¤ects are somewhat di¤erent. An increase in 
implies that some demand is shifted from Brand N to Brand S. All else equal, this contributes
to a lower wage in the North and a higher wage in the South. However, an increase in  also
increases the implicit competition between workers in the North and the South, since the two
brands become more equal.12 The increased intensity of competition between the two unions
has a dampening e¤ect on wages. This reinforces the wage drop in the North while it makes the
direction of the wage response in the South ambiguous. If  is su¢ ciently high to begin with
( > 0:51) and a is also su¢ ciently high, the inter-union competition e¤ect is the dominant
force for wage negotiations in the South, leading to a drop in wS .
11Since workers in the North and the South are implicitly Bertrand competitors, there are also second-order
feedback e¤ects.
12This can be seen from (5), where a given price di¤erence yields a larger change in quantity when  is higher.
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For a given state of technology in the South, union utility and prots are
UN =
3 (3S   (4    4a(1  )))2
2 (16  )2 a (1  ) ; (31)
US =
3 (3+ a(1  )  (4  )S)2
2 (16  )2 a (1  ) ; (32)
 =
9
264 2S (8a  8a    8)  2S (7  16)
   7  16 + 2a (+ 16) (1  )  a2 (9+ 16) (1  )
375
4 (16  )2 (1  )a : (33)
Based on these union utility and prot expressions, we derive the following results:
Proposition 6 (i) An increase in  leads to higher prots and union utility in the South, but
reduces union utility in the North.
(ii) An increase in  leads to higher prots and lower union utility in the North, while union
utility in the South is reduced i¤  > 1631 and a >
(48+3 62) S( 64+124 172+23)
(31 16)(1 ) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
As before, the rm benets from both types of transfers, absent any cost of investment.
Similarly, the negative impact of both types of technology transfer for workers in the North
comes as no surprise  given Proposition 5. This is also in line with the results for the case
of an exogenous wage in the South (cf. Proposition 3). However, workers in the South benet
from skill upgrading, but might not benet from product quality upgrading. This is in line with
the wage e¤ects discussed above (Proposition 5). Thus, with wage bargaining in the North and
the South, it might be the case that a particular type of technology transfer product quality
upgrading makes workers in both countries worse o¤. As previously discussed in relation to
Proposition 5, the reason is that, for certain parameter congurations, product quality upgrading
can be used as an e¤ective instrument to increase the degree of competition between the two
unions, causing wages to fall in both countries.
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6.2 Technology transfer and minimum wage policies
In line with the previous analysis, we now ask how labour market conditions in the South a¤ect
the incentives for technology transfer. More specically, we consider the e¤ect of a minimum
wage policy on the optimal transfer of technology. We will distinguish between the cases where
(i) the minimum wage binds (i.e., the minimum wage is set above the equilibrium wage level
resulting from bargaining), and (ii) the minimum wage does not bind but a¤ects wage bargaining
through an increase in the reservation wage level.
6.2.1 A binding minimum wage
Except for the case where wages in the South decrease as a response to product quality upgrading
(see Proposition 5), the minimum wage cannot be set at the present wage level, but must be
assumed to be somewhat higher, for the policy to have an e¤ect on technology transfer. However,
below we analyse the case where the minimum wage is set exactly at the equilibrium level given
by (27), but wages are nevertheless treated as constant under the minimum wage. If incentives
for technology transfer strictly increase in this case, we can conclude that the minimum wage
can be somewhat above the equilibrium level without a¤ecting this result.
In the following, we use our previous results and calculate the di¤erence in @@() with and
without minimum wages. For consistency, we set  = rN = 1 and  = 12 . We have
 =

@
@
jwS const  
@
@
jwS variable

wS=w

S
=
3
 
8a(1  ) + 8+ 2   (16  7)S

(a(1  ) + 3)
8 (16  )2 (1  ) a ; (34)
where wS is given by (27). Equivalently, the e¤ect of a binding minimum wage on incentives for
product quality upgrading is given by
 =

@
@
jwS const  
@
@
jwS variable

wS=w

S
=
3 ( (8 + + 8a(1  ))  (16  7)S)
 
12S + 48 + a
 
16  32+ 2
8

a (1  ) (16  )3
 : (35)
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We obtain the following results:
Proposition 7 (i) The introduction of a binding, small impact, minimum wage will increase
incentives for skill upgrading.
(ii) The incentives for product quality upgrading is reduced when introducing a binding min-
imum wage of any size if a > 12S+48
32 2 16 and  > 4(4 
p
15):
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to grasp the intuition behind these results, consider rst the incentives for skill
upgrading. From Proposition 4 we know that an exogenous increase in wS will increase (decrease)
incentives for skill upgrading if !S < (>) b!. This suggests that the introduction of a binding
minimum wage might reduce incentives for skill upgrading if the wage level is su¢ ciently high
to begin with. However, Proposition 7 shows that this will not happen for small impact
minimum wages. The reason is that, in the absence of a binding minimum wage, incentives
for skill upgrading are lower with than without wage bargaining in the South. When workers
in the South are unionised, part of the gain from the technology transfer will be appropriated
by workers in the South through higher wages (cf. Proposition 5). This wage e¤ect of the
technology investment is eliminated by a binding minimum wage, increasing the rms return
on a given technology transfer. The elimination of the wage response means that incentives for
skill upgrading is unambiguously increased by the introduction of a binding (but relatively small
impact) minimum wage. Similarly, if the bargained wage is increasing in , the introduction of
a binding minimum wage makes the rm able to upgrade product quality without the fear of a
corresponding wage increase in the South. Consequently, incentives for such investments will be
higher than if wages were exogenous to begin with.
When seen in conjunction with Proposition 4, we can conclude that the e¤ect of minimum
wages on technology transfer is clearly di¤erent when the possibility of wage bargaining in the
South is introduced. In short, the introduction of a binding minimum wage in the South is
more likely to spur technology transfer of both types when workers in the South have some
bargaining power in the absence of such a minimum wage. With wage bargaining, a small impact
minimum wage will now always increase incentives for skill upgrading, regardless of the original
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wage level. Furthermore, product quality upgrading now only becomes less protable if both
a and  are su¢ ciently high, which roughly corresponds to the case where the bargained wage
in South is decreasing in  (cf. Proposition 5). What is similar to the previous case, though,
is that a minimum wage policy in the South may lead to a shift in incentives for technology
transfer from product quality upgrading to skill upgrading, but not the other way around.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 7 is that the presence of collective bargaining
power for workers in the South increases the likelihood that workers in the North might su¤er
from the introduction of a binding minimum wage in the South. The direct e¤ect is still positive
(@UN=@wS > 0), but this could in principle be outweighed by increased technology transfer of
both types.
6.2.2 A non-binding minimum wage
Since the reservation wage of workers should reect outside options, it is reasonable to assume
that it should be (partly) a¤ected by a legal minimum wage that also applies to the labour
market outside the rm in question. Thus, one possible e¤ect of a minimum wage policy is that
the minimum wage does not bind directly, but indirectly a¤ects the bargained wage through an
increase in the reservation wage rS . How would this a¤ect incentives for technology transfer?
As in Section 5, we can investigate this question by simply looking at the second order partial
derivatives of the prot function.
The signs of the e¤ect on skill upgrading and product quality upgrading incentives are given
by the signs of, respectively,
@2
@@rS
=
9 (8 (a(1  ) + 1 + )  (32  14)$S)
22 (16  )2 (1  )a (36)
and
@2
@@rS
=
9

2
 
560  1902 + 213   256  22 16a (1  )2 + 160  (23 + 2)
4 (16  )3 (1  )2 2a : (37)
From (36)-(37), we derive the following results:
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Proposition 8 (i) If rS increases, the incentives for skill upgrading are always increased if
a > 64 38+
2
6(1 ) , always decreased if a <
128 112+112
32(4 5+2) and otherwise increased (decreased) if
S < (>)
8a(1 )+8+2
32 14 .
(ii) If rS increases, the incentives for product quality upgrading are decreased unless a >
48 14+22
30 52 16 and S >
2(16a(1 )2+160 (23+2))
560 1902+213 256 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
In one particular sense, the above proposition reinforces the results in Proposition 7. By
assuming workers in the South to have some bargaining power, the scope for minimum wage
legislation to stimulate both types of technology transfer is enlarged, even if the minimum wage is
not binding but only works indirectly through a higher reservation wage. However, the parameter
space where incentives for product quality upgrading are strengthened is comparatively narrow,
since a > 4 and  > 3  
p
145
5 t 0:59 are necessary, but not su¢ cient, conditions for a positive
relationship between rS and the rms optimal choice of .
7 Concluding remarks
How do labour market conditions a¤ect North-South technology transfer in multinational rms?
In contrast to previous literature, we focus on internal labour market externalities caused by the
power struggle between trade unions representing workers in di¤erent subsidiaries (in the North
and the South) of the multinational rm. In this context, North-South technology transfer 
whether skill upgrading or product quality upgrading in the South is partly motivated by the
multinational rms desire to curb trade union power. It is therefore no surprise that northern
workers stand to su¤er from such transfer of technology. A more striking nding is that a
particular type of technology transfer, namely product quality upgrading, may hurt not only
northern but also southern workers. This possibility arises if workers have collective bargaining
power not only in the North, but also in the South.
A minimum wage policy that lifts the wage level of the poorer southern workers may a¤ect
worker welfare in unexpected ways through changes in technology transfer incentives. We nd
that higher wages in the South can actually increase incentives for skill upgrading and may even
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hurt northern workers as an end result, if the incentives for skill upgrading are triggered to a
su¢ cient degree. We also nd that a minimum wage policy is more likely to induce technology
transfer, even in the form of product quality upgrading, if southern workers have collective
bargaining power.
Does our analysis suggest that technology transfer is excessive? One should perhaps refrain
from bold policy statements. We have identied one externality at play stemming from multi-
nationalsdesire to gain power over northern (and sometimes even southern) workers. However,
in a fuller picture there might be many other externalities and market imperfections at play,
so in the end technology use in a developing country might be too small.13 Nevertheless, in a
well-known study Xu (2000) points out that US multinationals seem to be sources of technolog-
ical spillovers only in countries who already have achieved some level of development. The least
developed countries fail to take advantage of such transfers and spillovers because they lack the
minimum human capital threshold level that is necessary in order to do this. In such a light, we
think it is somewhat paradoxical that power struggle in the North can lead multinationals not
only to produce in the South at a very high technological level, but that technology transfers
could take the form of producing products in the South that almost can match product quality
in the North, rather than investing in upgrading the skills of the host country labour force.
However, our analysis also shows that a potential remedy for directing investments away from
product quality upgrading and towards skill upgrading is a minimum wage policy that lifts the
wage level of workers in developing countries.
13For example, Ghatak and Jiang (2002) point to credit market imperfections as a reason for a too large
informal sector in the developing world.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) The positive sign of @UN@wS follows immediately from (14). From
(15) we have
@
@wS
=  (2  )
2 (rN   !S) +  (1  ) (4  2+ ) (a  !S)
2a (1  ) (2 +  (   1))2 : (A1)
This expression is monotonically decreasing in rN . From (12), qS > 0 and qN > 0 require
that rN 2 (r; r), where r := !S(2 ) (a !S)(1 )(2 ) and r := !S + a (1  ). Since r   r =
( +2)(a !S)(1 )
(2 ) , this set is non-empty i¤ a > !S . Thus, the existence of an interior
solution requires that a > !S . From (A1), we have that @@wS

rN=r
=   (a !S)2a(2 +) < 0
if a > !S . Since @@wS is monotonically decreasing in rN , we conclude that
@
@wS
< 0 for all
rN 2 (r; r).
(ii) From (14) we have
@UN
@
=  

 (!S + a (1  )  rN )
2 +  (   1)
 (2  ) (a (1  ) + rN   !S)
2a (1  )2 (2 +  (   1)) < 0 (A2)
and
@UN
@
=  

 (!S + a (1  )  rN )
2 +  (   1)
 !S ( + 1) (2  )
2a (1  ) (2 +  (   1)) < 0: (A3)
The negative signs of both (A2) and (A3) in the interior solution are conrmed by applying the
restriction rN > !S and by noticing that qN > 0 requires rN < r := !S + a (1  ).
From (15) we have
@
@
= !S
(2  )2 (rN  !S) +  (1  ) (4  2+ ) (a  !S)
2a (1  ) (2 +  (   1))2 : (A4)
Setting rN at the lower limit rN yields @@

rN=r
= !S(a !S)2( +2)a > 0 if a > !S . Since
@
@ is
monotonically increasing in rN , we conclude that @@ > 0 for all rN 2 (r; r).
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From (15) we also have
@
@
=
(2  )2 (rN  !S) (!S (1  2) + rN) +  (1  )2 (a  !S) (!S + a) (4  2+ )
4a2 (1  )2 (2 +  (   1))2 :
(A5)
It is easily conrmed that the numerator in (A5) is increasing in rN if rN > !S , which is
required to secure an interior solution for all  2 (0; 1). Setting rN equal to the lower limit for
an interior solution, we have that @@

rN=r
= (a !S)2(2+( 1)) > 0 if a > !S . Due to the established
monotonicity in rN , we conclude that @@ > 0 for all rN 2 (r; r). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) From (16)-(17), both second-order cross derivatives are positive
if a (1  ) > (rN   !S). This condition always holds in an interior solution, since qN > 0
requires a(1  ) > (wN   !S) and wN > rN .
(ii) From (19), a su¢ cient condition for @
2
@wS@
< 0 is that !S +  (rN   2!S) > 0. The
second term is convex in  with a minimum at  = !SrN . For the minimum value of the second
term, the condition is given by !S

1  !SrN

> 0, which is always true since !S > rN ; thus
@2
@wS@
< 0. From (18), the sign of @
2
@wS@
depends on the sign of the numerator. It is straight-
forward to establish that the numerator is monotonically decreasing in !S and that the sign is
positive (negative) if !S is below (above) a threshold value, given by
b! := 
2
 
a (1  ) (4   (2  )) + rN (2  )2
 (1  ) (4   (2  )) + (2  )2
!
: (A6)
Thus, @
2
@wS@
> (<) 0 if !S < (>)!. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) From (26), the e¤ects of a, rS and  follow immediately, while
the e¤ect of  is given by
@wN
@
=  3 (20a  S   4)
(16  )2 ; (A7)
which is clearly negative for a > 1.
(ii) From (27), the e¤ects of a, rS and  follow immediately, while the e¤ect of  is given by
@wS
@
=
 
16a  32a+ 12S + a2 + 48


(16  )2 : (A8)
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The numerator is monotonically decreasing in a if  > 16   4p15. In this case the numerator
is negative (thus @wS=@ < 0) if a >
48+12S
32 2 16 . Otherwise, if  < 16  4
p
15, the numerator is
positive (thus @wS=@ > 0) for all a > 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Using (28), the signs of @UN@ and
@US
@ are easily established
from (31) and (32). From (33) we have
@
@
= 9S

(8a(1  ) + 8 + )  (16  7)S
2 (16  )2 (1  )a

: (A9)
Using the restriction S <  (see eq. 30), we have
(8a(1  ) + 8 + )  (16  7)S >
 (1  ) (16  ) (a  1)
4   > 0;
thus @@ > 0:
(ii) From (31) we have
@UN
@
=
3 [3S   4 + + 4a(1  )]

(54  9)S   (40 + 4+ 2 + 56a  52a  4a2)

2 (1  )2 a (16  )3 :
(A10)
Using S <  we have
(54  9)S   (40 + 4+ 2 + 56a  52a  4a2)
<
(1  ) (16  ) (5a+   10  14a)
4   < 0;
thus @UN@ < 0.
From (32) we have
@US
@
=  3 (3+ a(1  )  (4  )S)
2 (16  )3 a (1  )2 2
264    (31  16) (  1) a+ 48 + 3  62
+S
  64 + 124  172 + 23
375 :
(A11)
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Assume that @US@ < 0. This requires
   (31  16) (  1) a+ 48 + 3  62+ S   64 + 124  172 + 23 > 0;
or
(16  31) (1  ) a < S
  64 + 124  172 + 23  (48 + 3  62)

:
For  < 1631 , this implies
a <
S
  64 + 124  172 + 23  (48 + 3  62)
 (16  31) (1  ) ;
which is negative for  < 1631 . Thus
@US
@ cannot be negative on this interval. For  >
16
31 , the
above inequality becomes
a >
(48 + 3  62)  rS
  64 + 124  172 + 23
 (31  16) (1  ) :
What remains is to show that @@ > 0. We have
@
@
=
9N(a; ; S)
4 (16  )3 (1  )2 2a; (A12)
where
N(a; ; S) : = 
2
0B@ 176 + 176a2 + 190a  55+ 142   343a2
 96a  922a+ 1582a2   2a3 + 93a2
1CA
+2S
 
560  1902 + 213   256
 22S
 
16a  23  22   32a+ 162a+ 160 : (A13)
It is now easily shown that N is increasing in a :
@N(a; ; S)
@a
= 22 (1  )2 (176a  48  + 9a  16S) > 0:
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Using (28), we know that
a > max

4    3S
4(1  ) ;
(4  )S   3
(1  )

:
Which restriction is binding is determined by the parameters:
4    3
4(1  ) >
(4  )  3
(1  )
i¤
(16  ) (  ) > 0:
Thus, for S < , the binding restriction is a >
4  3
4(1 ) . Using the fact that N is monotonically
increasing in a, we know that
N (a; ; S) > N

4    3S
4(1  ) ; ; S

=
1
16
(16  )2  33S  16S   2   16 (S   ) ;
which is positive if S < : Similarly, for S > , the binding restriction is a >
(4 ) 3
(1 ) , and
thus
N(a; ; S) > N(
(4  )S   3
(1  ) ; ; S) = 2 (16  )
2 (5S   (4 + S)) (S   ) > 0:
Thus @@ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. (i) Applying the restriction  2  ; , the positive sign of  is
easily conrmed.
(ii) From (35), since  (8 + + 8a(1  ))   (16   7)S > 0 if S < , the sign of 
depends entirely on 12 + 48 + a
  32+ 2 + 16, which is negative if  > 4(4   p15) and
a > 12S+48
32 2 16 . In this case we are assured that any minimum wage will induce a lower incentive
for product quality upgrading, because @@ jwS const is decreasing in wS , and we have used the
lowest possible binding minimum wage to calculate . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 8. (i) From (36), @
2
@@rS
is positive (negative) if
S < (>)
8a(1  ) + 8+ 2
32  14 :
Using (28), @
2
@@rS
is always positive if a > 64 38+
2
6(1 ) and always negative if a <
128 112+112
32(4 5+2) .
(ii) From (37), we have
@2
@@rS
= 9
0@2S  560  1902 + 213   256  22

16a (1  )2 + 160  (23 + 2)

4 (16  )3 (1  )2 2a
1A
(A14)
The numerator in (A14) is increasing in S for
 >  :=   2
63
3
r
208 963 + 1134
p
33 949

  410
63 3
q 
208 963 + 1134
p
33 949
 + 19063 ; (A15)
and decreasing in S otherwise. For  < 
, @
2
@@rS
is always negative. For  > , @
2
@@rS
is
positive if S >
2(16a(1 )2+160 (23+2))
560 1902+213 256 : However using the restriction S < , this cannot
happen for a < 48 14+2
2
30 52 16 . Q.E.D.
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